English Typing Test

AFR CourtNo.-84 Case:-APPLICATIONU/S482No.-8723of2021 Applicant:-RajitramShuklaAnd2Others OppositeParty:-StateofU.P.andAnother CounselforApplicant:-PradeepKumarMishra CounselforOppositeParty:-G.A. Hon'bleDr.YogendraKumarSrivastava,J. 1.HeardSriPradeepMishra,learnedcounselfortheapplicantsandSriPankajSaxena,learnedAdditionalGovernmentAdvocate-IappearingfortheState-oppositeparty. 2.ThepresentapplicationunderSection482oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure1hasbeenfiledseekingtoquashthechargesheetdated31.12.2015aswellassummoningorderdated18.11.2020passedbySpecialJudgeS.C./S.T.Act,JaunpuraswellasentireproceedingsofS.S.T.No.284/2020,arisingoutofCaseCrimeNo.249/2015,underSection323,504,506I.P.C.and3(1)10S.C./S.T.Act,PoliceStationBarsathiDistrictJaunpur. 3.AchallengeissoughttoberaisedtotheproceedingsofS.S.T.No.284/2020,arisingoutofCaseCrimeNo.249/2015,andalsotothecharge-sheetdated31.12.2015aswellassummoningorderdated18.11.2020,byraisingapreliminarypointandcontendingthattheproceedingswouldbebarredbylimitationinviewoftheprovisionscontainedunderSection468CrPC. 4.Learnedcounselfortheapplicantshassubmittedthatintheinstantcase,theincidentinquestionisstatedtohaveoccurredon13.05.2015regardingwhichanFIRwaslodgedonthesamedayi.e.13.05.2015,andafterinvestigationthepolicereportwassubmittedon31.12.2015whereuponcognizancewastaken.However,sincetheorderpassedbytheMagistratesummoningtheapplicant-accusedisdated18.11.2020,thebarunderSection468wouldbecomeoperativeandtheproceedingswouldbebarredbylimitation. 5.Inresponsetotheaforesaidcontention,learnedAdditionalGovernmentAdvocate-IpointsoutthatthequestionastowhatwouldbetherelevantdateforthepurposesofcomputingtheperiodoflimitationunderSection468CrPCisnolongerresintegra.HehasplacedrelianceupontheConstitutionBenchjudgmentinthecaseofSarahMathewVs.TheInstituteofCardioVascularDiseasesandOrs.2,whereinnoticingaconflictbetweenatwoJudgeBenchdecisionoftheSupremeCourtinthecaseofBharatDamodarKaleVs.StateofA.P.3,whichhadbeenfollowedinanothertwoJudgeBenchdecisioninJapaniSahooVs.ChandraSekharMohanty4,andathreeJudgeBenchdecisioninKrishnaPillaiVs.T.A.Rajendran5,thecasewasplacedbeforeathreeJudgeBenchforanauthoritativepronouncementandthereafteritwasreferredtoafiveJudgeConstitutionBenchtoexaminetheissue. 6.ThequestionswhichwereconsideredbytheConstitutionBenchinthecaseofSarahMathew(supra)areasfollows:- "3.1.(i)WhetherforthepurposesofcomputingtheperiodoflimitationunderSection468CrPCtherelevantdateisthedateoffilingofthecomplaintorthedateofinstitutionoftheprosecutionorwhethertherelevantdateisthedateonwhichaMagistratetakescognizanceoftheoffence? 3.2.(ii)Whichofthetwocasesi.e.KrishnaPillaiorBharatKale(whichisfollowedinJapaniSahoo)laysdownthecorrectlaw?" 7.ReferringtothelegislativehistoryofChapterXXXVIoftheCode,itwasobservedasfollows:- "19.Toaddressthequestionswhichariseinthisreference,itisnecessarytohavealookatthelegislativehistoryofChapterXXXVICrPC.TheCriminalProcedureCode,1898containednogeneralprovisionforlimitation.ThoughundercertainspeciallawsliketheNegotiableInstrumentsAct,1881,theTradeandMerchandiseMarksAct,1958,thePoliceAct,1861,TheFactoriesAct,1948andtheArmyAct,1950,thereareprovisionsprescribingperiodoflimitationforprosecutionofoffences,therewasnogenerallawoflimitationforprosecutionofotheroffences.TheapproachofthisCourtwhiledealingwiththeargumentthattherewasdelayinlaunchingprosecution,whenintheCriminalProcedureCode(1898),therewasnogeneralprovisionprescribinglimitation,couldbeascertainedfromitsjudgmentinCollectorofCustomsv.L.R.Melwani.ItwasurgedbeforetheHighCourtinthatcasethattherewasdelayinlaunchingprosecution.TheHighCourtheldthatthedelaywassatisfactorilyexplained.Whiledealingwiththisquestion,thisCourtheldthatinanycaseprosecutioncouldnothavebeenquashedonthegroundofdelaybecauseitwasnotthecaseoftheaccusedthatanyperiodoflimitationwasprescribedforfilingthecomplaint.Hencethecomplaintcouldnothavebeenthrownoutonthesolegroundthattherewasdelayinfilingthesame.ThisCourtfurtherobservedthatthequestionofdelayinfilingcomplaintmaybeacircumstancetobetakenintoconsiderationinarrivingatthefinalverdictandbyitselfitaffordsnogroundfordismissingthecomplaint.ThispositionunderwentachangetosomeextentwhenChapterXXXVIwasintroducedintheCriminalProcedureCodeasweshallsoonsee. 20.ItispertinenttonotethattheLimitationAct,1963doesnotapplytocriminalproceedingsexceptforappealsorrevisionsforwhichexpressprovisionismadeinArticles114,115,131and132thereof.Afterconductingextensivestudyofcriminallawsofvariouscountries,theLawCommissionofIndiaappearstohaverealizedthatprovidingprovisionoflimitationforprosecutionofcriminaloffencesofcertaintypeingenerallawwould,infact,begoodforthecriminaljusticesystem.TheLawCommissionnotedthatthereasonstojustifyintroductionofprovisionsprescribinglimitationingenerallawforcriminalcasesaresimilartothosewhichjustifysuchprovisionsincivillawsuchaslikelihoodofevidencebeingcurtailed,failingmemoriesofwitnessesanddisappearanceofwitnesses.Suchaprovision,intheopinionoftheLawCommission,willquickendiligence,preventoppressionandinthegeneralpublicinterestwouldbringanendtolitigation.TheLawCommissionalsofeltthatthecourtwould
0:00